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Works Cited

Bratersky, Aleksander. “Putin’s Favorite Selected as Olympic Mascot.” The St. Petersburg Times [St. Petersburg, Russia] 2 March 2011: 7. Web.

Chernov, Sergei. “Local Transport Fares Up Leading to ‘Hare’ Protests.” The St. Petersburg Times [St. Petersburg, Russia] 20 Jan. 2009: 3. Web.

Gerber, Adolph. Great Russian Animal Tales. 1891. New York: Burt Franklin, 1970. Print.

Haney, Jack. Russian Animal Tales. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999. Print.

“Hare Island.” St. Petersburg Encyclopedia. 2004. Web.

“Ioannovsky Bridge.” St. Petersburg Encyclopedia. 2004. Web.

Lincoln, W. Bruce. “Sunlight at Midnight: Peter the Great and the Rise of Modern Russia.” The New York Times 26 August 2001. Web.

“Monument ‘the hare.’” BaikalNature. n.p. Web. 2009.

Patterson, Simon. “In Memory of the City’s Most Dangerous Floods.” The St. Petersburg Times [St. Petersburg, Russia] 3 July 2001. Web.

“Photo of the Day: Flood Strikes St. Petersburg.” Russia Beyond the Headlines. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Web. 16 November 2010.

Propp, Vladimir. The Russian Folktale. Trans. Sibelan Forrester. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2012. Print.

Sokolov, Yuri. Russian Folklore. Trans. Catherine Smith. Detroit: Folklore Associates, 1971. Print.

“St. Petersburg Gets Protecting Dam.” The Voice of Russia. Web. 12 Aug. 2011.

“The Hare Escaping Flooding.” Saint-Petersburg.com. Web. 2013.

“Unusual Monuments in St. Petersburg.” Prosveshcheniye Publishers. Web. 27 July 2012.

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Zenit St. Petersburg (Brian Costello)

CrestZenit St. Petersburg, founded in 1925, has evolved over time to become not only the premier football club St. Petersburg, but also a significant cultural institution. This importance stems from the fact that Zenit is the only major professional sports team in a city of 5 million inhabitants. To put this into perspective, Chicago, a city of under 3 million people, is home to 5 major professional sports team. This monopoly on sporting support can be seen in a multitude of ways, most noticeably through the sea of laser blue and white jerseys that flood the city streets. It is no coincidence that when Zenit played in Manchester, the British Consulate General in St. Petersburg prepared to process up to 12,000 visa applications. By contrast, the Consulate generally processes only about 22,000 of these applications per year (“St. Petersburg Times” 1). The foundation of Zenit’s cultural legitimacy comes through its mass popularity. It is no hyperbole when Zenit’s website states that “Zenit long ago became one of St. Petersburg’s key brands, alongside the Hermitage Museum, the Mariinsky Theater, and the fountains of Peterhof” (“What role does Zenit play in the life of the city?”). To most inhabitants, the culture of Zenit is the culture of the masses of Petersburg. Zenit is one of the few cultural landmarks not tied to the grand façade of Petersburg. It is a reminder that Petersburg is not just the phantasmagorical creation of Peter the Great, but also a real city that is home to 5 million people. The position of Zenit St. Petersburg serves a critical function as a microcosm of Petersburg as a whole. Zenit St. Petersburg is a club full of paradoxes, and the problems it faces are the very same ones that plague the city of St. Petersburg and Russia in general. The Zenit experience is the Petersburg experience, for better or worse.

Zenit St. Petersburg, in comparison to its rivals in Moscow, is a club without much of a storied history. Formed in 1925, Zenit were originally known as Stalinets, in honor of Stalin but also a play on Russian word for steel. After 1939, however, when the Zenit team lost in that year’s USSR Cup, Stalin ordered that they change their name since he viewed that they were no longer worthy of being named after him. Zenit’s history in the Soviet League is not an illustrious one, only winning one title, in 1984. One embarrassing episode for the club came in 1967 when the team should have been relegated, though it was decided that relegating the only team from St. Petersburg on the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution would be unwise. After the fall of the Soviet Union Zenit have since joined the Russian League where they have been relatively decent. Fortunes took a turn in 2005, when Russian oil company Gazprom took control of the club. This ownership change did not prevent some from speculating about the true reason for Gazprom’s purchase, however. As one businessman in Moscow stated, “It is public knowledge in Russia…that an executive position at Gazprom has been set aside for President Putin for when he eventually retires from political life. Putin is a native of St. Petersburg, and this is undoubtedly the reason why Gazprom have taken control of Zenit, rather than, say, any of the Moscow clubs. While, admittedly, the president is not actually that great a football fan, it’s obvious that he would still enjoy seeing his home-town side rise to the top in Russia” (Bennetts 126). The links between the Putin regime and Gazprom go much farther than just speculation, however. Like many of Russia’s largest companies which formed from Soviet state enterprises, there are suspiciously close connections between the two institutions. For example, from 2002 to 2008 the Chairman of Gazprom was none other than Dmitri Medvedev, Putin’s second-in-command and President of Russia from 2008 to 2012.

Zenit Uniform
Zenit’s official jersey

The influence of Gazprom can be seen in many different aspects of Zenit St. Petersburg, most blatantly on the front of each jersey as the team’s official sponsor. On a fundamental level, the introduction of Gazprom has stacked the deck in favor of Zenit. The influx of wealth that has been introduced since Gazprom’s takeover is nothing short of astounding. The annual budget of Zenit in 2009 was $99 million, over 52% more than its nearest rival Spartak Moscow (“St. Petersburg Times”). This infusion of cash is also seen in the new signings. After the purchase by Gazprom, the club was able to secure the services of high-profile soccer stars Hulk and Axel Witsel during the summer transfer window of 2012, enjoying the increase in international prestige associated with such visible signings.

This culture of wealth has not been completely without problems, however. There has been a growing divide between the new, mostly foreign, players and the domestic players, who were around before the club was bought out by Gazprom. One incident that brought this issue to the fore was the Igor Denisov wage scandal. Denisov, an integral member of the squad before the additions of Hulk and Witsel, voiced his disapproval at these signings. He argued that Hulk and Witsel were not worth the astronomical wages being paid to them, and that “the principles of how the club is run are the most important as well as the respect of the Russian players, especially us – the St Petersburg natives who have always made up the core of a team like Zenit” (“Demoted Denisov demands wage parity at Zenit”). This rift in the locker room ended up with the club demoting Denisov to train with the youth team and eventually he was sold to Anzhi Makhachkala, another club in the Russian Premier League. While Denisov’s transfer might imply that the issue has been handled, the employment of these foreign players irks not just some Russian players, but other groups in St. Petersburg as well.

 

Axel Witsel, Hulk
Hulk (left) and Witsel (right) are Zenit’s first black players

Landscrona is the largest supporters’ club for Zenit St. Petersburg. After the signings of Hulk and Witsel, however, the group released a manifesto that demanded the club field an all-white, heterosexual team. Not coincidental here is that both Hulk and Witsel are black players, with the former from Brazil and the latter from Belgium. Later in the manifesto Landscrona stated that “dark-skinned players are all but forced down Zenit’s throat now, which only brings out a negative reaction”. On the topic of homosexuals, the declaration stated that gay players were “unworthy of our great city” (“St. Petersburg Times”). While racism and homophobia are still tacitly accepted in Russian general culture, the problem is even more acute in St. Petersburg, where even former Zenit coach Dick Advocaat said it would be impossible to sign a black player for the club. The club’s response to Landscrona stressed that the “team’s policy is aimed at development and integration into the world soccer community, and holds no archaic views” (“St. Petersburg Times”). While this may in fact be the case, it is very interesting that Hulk and Witsel were the first black players to ever sign for Zenit, making them the last team in the Russian Premier League to have at least one black player. The power of this socially engrained racism is so strong that the fans in Landscrona do not even believe themselves to be racist and that “the absence of black Zenit players is just an important tradition that underlines the team’s identity and nothing more” (“St. Petersburg Times”). The action of Landscrona just highlights the paradoxical structure of Russian society as it dives into the 21st century. Russia is hosting the 2018 World Cup, the largest sporting event in the world, but it is still a place where fans at a sporting event can throw bananas at black players with little fear of repercussions. While the standard line in Russia is that racism is not tolerated, the actions of Russian clubs, particularly Zenit, do little to discourage racist behavior. In this way, the actions of the clubs mirror the reality of racial relations in Russia at the present. As recently as 2006 a survey done by Alexander Brod, director of the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, showed that over 50% of Russians exhibited racist or xenophobic tendencies (Gedeyeva). It is in this culture of casual racism in which Zenit operates, allowing for the stadium experience to be tainted by the poison of racism.

Zenit Fans
Zenit supporters

Another of the issues that plagues the stadium experience is that of hooliganism and violence at, and after, Zenit games. While it is a perfectly acceptable cultural reaction to get emotional or riled up by the events of a game, Zenit fans often take this reaction way past the point of acceptable behavior and into hooliganism. This trend of hooliganism is one that plagues all of Russian soccer, not just Zenit fans. When comparing Russian hooliganism to traditional English hooliganism, one anonymous fan said, “Basically, in recent years, British fans have just shouted a lot and chucked bottles. I was at the 2006 World Cup and saw how they behaved. They’d find a camera, chant, wave their fists and run off. Ridiculous. In Russia, there is nothing of the sort. When two groups of fans meet, they get right down to business, and fight until the opposing fans are either on the floor, or run away. It’s the same all over Eastern Europe right now. We respect the English tradition of hooliganism, but we no longer fear them. They are weak, right now, compared to Russia, Poland, Serbia and so on” (Bennetts 141). These words are not an exaggeration, as evidenced by the actions of Zenit supporters over the past few years. For example, after a 2009 game between Zenit and Spartak Moscow over 500 Zenit fans were detained by police out of the 8000 visiting Zenit fans who attended the match. Most were detained for starting fights, breaking chairs, and throwing smoke bombs or fireworks (Titova). Another time Zenit had to forfeit a game against Dinamo Moscow, when a Zenit fan threw a firecracker at Dinamo goalkeeper Anton Shunin and injured him, prompting the referee to call the game (“St. Petersburg Times”). Just as with racism, a casual acceptance of hooliganism plagues the Russian soccer landscape, and Russian society. This acceptance of hooliganism can also be seen in the fact that Zenit protested the forfeit loss, even though one of its fans injured an opposing player. Incidents like these place a black mark on the spectator experience of a Russian soccer game, and challenge Russia and St. Petersburg as they prepare for the 2018 World Cup. The World Cup is a pivotal moment for Russia, not only because it puts the international spotlight on the nation, but because it creates the need for new Russian infrastructure to support the event, mainly in the creation of new stadiums.

 

Petrovsky Stadium
Petrovsky Stadium

Throughout its history, Zenit has played in a variety of stadiums, which have illustrated the shifting cultural landscapes that both the team, and sport in general, have occupied in Russian and Soviet life. The first, and current, stadium used by Zenit is the Petrovsky Stadium, which was built in 1925, around the same time as the formation of Zenit.  This stadium was built right before the heyday of Soviet physical culture, which helps to explain why it is relatively small and only has seating for 21 thousand spectators.  It was during this period that there raged a debate about the place of sport and physical culture in the Soviet Communist experiment. Initially, the idea of competitive sports in the Soviet Union was one that was met with skepticism. One side of the debate focused on how sports were, at least initially, seen as a bourgeois pursuit that put itself at odds with the proletarian aspirations of the USSR. Eventually, however, the supporters of organized sports won out, arguing that organized sports in the USSR was different than sports in capitalist countries, since sports in the USSR strove to embody the ideals of socialism. From this, the idea of a physical culture (fizkul’tura), of a disciplined and fit socialist body housing an agile socialist mind, became a strong social current in the Stalin era. “In 1931, Soviet leaders announced an annual Physical Culture Day which was to become the apotheosis of Stalinist body culture. Such festivities were as much political theatre with sport as theme as they were a means of advertising Soviet sporting achievement” (Riordan 90). The idea of the body culture went much further beyond just the striving of the people; it became a tool of propaganda to meld human health with the attainment of socialist ideals. This idea was helped with the aid of posters and photographs portraying the quintessential Soviet citizens, both fit and supporting Soviet ideals and the Soviet work ethic. The logic behind such a concept was that increased physical health would also lead to increased mental and emotional health in pursuit of Soviet ideals in other facets of life.

It was in this context of hyper-physical culture in which the next of Zenit’s stadiums was built. Kirov Stadium initially started construction in 1932, but was only completed in 1950, due to World War II and construction delays. Kirov Stadium would remain Zenit’s home from its opening to 1989. This stadium was immense, packing in over 100,000 people, a shining testament to Soviet power, ingenuity and strength. Just as the propaganda in Soviet physical culture highlighted the ideological vigor and natural superiority of the Soviet citizens, massive stadiums, such as Kirov, served as a symbol of the preeminence of the Soviet political system and communist ideals. The idea of the super-stadium as a grand display of political might was part of Soviet interest in architectural ‘gigantism’ as a way of conveying socialist superiority. Another immense stadium built during this time was the Bagirov Stadium in Baku, which held over 80 thousand spectators. There were even plans to build the Stalin Izmailovsky Stadium in Moscow, which would have held 350,000 spectators and would have served as one of the landmark architectural sites in the world, further bolstering the political legitimacy of the Soviet system (O’Mahoney). This proposed stadium remained just a proposal, however, with the plans falling through and the stadium never being built.

 

Design of the "Spaceship'
Design of the “Spaceship’

Kirov Stadium was demolished in 2006 in order to make way for a new stadium for Zenit, Gazprom Arena. The design of the stadium, nicknamed the Spaceship, helps to highlight the growing Russian wealth in the 21st century and its changing perception in the international community. The main features of this arena are its sliding roof, a pitch that can be slid to outside the stadium and a system of heating to keep snow off the roofs, which allows for games to be played in most any conditions. Just as Kirov stadium served as a representation of the awe of the Soviet Union, the new Gazprom Arena represents the shifting cultural landscape in Russia. The stadium sports a sleek design; though the ultimate effect of the arena is to create a subdued atmosphere. It is almost as if the stadium exists there solely because it was meant to exist there, a paradigm of Russia’s return to prominence it deserves in the international system after the fall of the USSR and the chaos of the 90s. The choice of the Spaceship becomes even more interesting when compared to the other possible designs for the stadium. Many of the other plans for the stadium wished to emphasize different historical aspects of St. Petersburg or Russia in general (“Stadium designs for the new football stadium”). One of the proposals called for “recreating the idea of the former Kirov Stadium where Zenit played, with cascades of stairs, fountains and columns in Art Deco style on top of a hill”. Another of the proposals called for a multi-colored stadium, finding inspiration in the vibrant onion domes of St. Basil’s Cathedral and the Church on Spilled Blood. Yet another of the potential designs called for the arena to have a golden dome, reminiscent to the design for the second stage of the Mariinsky Theater. It is very interesting to note that even though Gazprom was one of the main funders of this new stadium, the actual decision for which stadium to build was made by City Hall. By choosing the Spaceship design, City Hall showed a steadfast maintenance to Zenit’s cultural appeal as distinct from both the relics of the Soviet Era, and Petersburg’s classical, tsarist past. Zenit’s cultural cache in Petersburg society comes from the fact that it is one of the only cultural institutions in Petersburg specifically formulated solely for the residents of the city on the Neva. The implicit paradox of this situation, however, is that the current driving force behind this institution for the people is Gazprom, a prominent symbol of Russian oligarchic culture and elitism.

 

Design based on Mariinsky Theater
Design based on the Mariinsky Theater

When the construction of Gazprom Arena was announced in the summer of 2006, it was billed as a progressive and functional development that would be finished by 2009 and cost only $225 million. Gazprom chairman Alexei Miller even went on record saying that the arena, “will be ready for the beginning of the 2009 football season” (Dranitsyna). It is now 2013 and the stadium has yet to be completed, with no specific date slated for its completion, but many believe it to be around 2015. The cost of the arena has also increased substantially, with the original estimations of $225 million growing to a figure of over a billion dollars. When the stadium was initially announced, City Hall said it would finance the project from the city’s coffers, as a show of mutual cooperation since Gazprom Neft had recently just registered as a taxpayer in St. Petersburg. For this purpose it earmarked around $283 million for the project. Now as the costs have risen, however, the city expects Gazprom to pay the difference between the original and updated cost of the stadium. While this may seem like a victory for City Hall initially, Gazprom’s main shareholder is the Russian state. And as one wry observer pointed out, “the main difference between private and state money is that no manager will be killed or even fired for inefficient use of the latter. And the modern stadium is a pathway to glory not profit” (Scherbakova).

In conclusion, Zenit St. Petersburg has established itself as not just the primary sports team in one of Europe’s largest cities, but also as a significant cultural institute. The club is a paradigm of St. Petersburg as a whole, full of paradoxes, such as the future promise versus the present reality. Or the contradiction that the team is run by oligarchs, but is primarily enjoyed by the people. The inherent problem when trying to create a cohesive narrative about Zenit is that the realities of the situation never arrange themselves succinctly into a clear story. Zenit serves as a microcosm for Petersburg as a whole, since the intricacies of Zenit clearly mirror larger tendencies of Petersburg culture. It is not just too simple to write off Zenit as just a sports team and disregard its broader impact on society, but also naïve. Zenit is an interesting representation of Petersburg, since the club is almost as complicated and paradoxical as the city itself.

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The Curious Case of the kommunalka (Taylor Lain)

The Soviet era was a time of massive change for Russia. This was especially true for the nation’s economy, which, primarily through the efforts of Vladimir I. Lenin and Joseph Stalin, transformed itself into what was essentially a defective manufacturing machine (Gerschenkron, 146). Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), some agricultural land and many businesses, notably those involved in banking, military industry, heavy industry, transportation, and foreign commerce, were nationalized and the kommunalki began to appear in places like Moscow and St. Petersburg to support the ever-increasing influx of people into the cities. Government-monopolized businesses also built their own dormitory-style communal living spaces to provide their workers with sources of housing (Colgate University). While these spaces allowed the Soviet government to subsidize the living costs of residents to almost nominal fees and went a long way to ease the financial burden of living for its citizens, the quick and shoddy construction of these buildings caused the living conditions within them to be cramped, pitiful, and extremely unclean (Colgate University). Families were not given nearly enough space to carry out their daily routines. For example, in the film Bed and Sofa (Tret’ia Meshchanska) Nikolai washed himself in the salon using water from a samovar and a bucket, as he lacked an actual bathroom. Flies, trash, and human waste in common areas were constant problems (Rubenshtein). This was especially true for those separate apartments in the khrushchoby (“Khrushchev slums”) built during the mid-1950s and 1960s under

Khrushchev (Boym 125, Colgate University).collectivized under the government. While some farming and certain “light” industries in consumer goods and services, textiles, chemicals, and the like remained partially privatized under the NEP, Stalin’s multiple subsequent Five-Year Plans eventually placed all of these under “the people’s” control (Curtis). New factories, which required enormous amounts of supplies and manpower to function, sprang up all over Russia. However, because of the nation’s past reliance on farming and the tenuous economic stability that serfdom provided in small towns and rural villages, much of the population lived in the countryside (Gerschenkron, 154-155). With more and more job opportunities popping up in the manufacturing plants of major cities, the nation underwent a tremendous demographic shift to urban areas. Unfortunately, at the time urban immigration could not be accommodated by city residences. The government began to place tight restrictions on and divide up what were originally one-family dwellings into multiple family accommodations (Starecheski, 174). These new and dramatically undersized government-owned communal apartments were known as kommunalki.

On top of the poor living conditions in which urban Soviet citizens found themselves, many residents had to cope with the many regulations and restrictions on Soviet residency. In order to even be eligible for housing, it was necessary to register with the local city government and obtain a residency permit, otherwise known as a propiska (Colgate University). These propiski, which Russian citizens were given along with their birth certificates and which would change along with their passports, began originally as a way for the government to track places of residence. Eventually, they became a way for citizens to be permitted or denied housing, and they also determined from where one would receive daycare and schooling services for children, rations, and the like (Colgate University). Once the permits were obtained, housing clerks who worked for district housing bureaus, regional housing administrations, or communal management departments in major cities would allot specific amounts of space to individuals based on their professions, medical conditions, stipulations outlined by the federal and local governments, and oftentimes their own whims. These allotments ranged from about five to nine square meters of free space (Colgate University). It was rare for a family to receive more than its given space to live—this occurred typically only with high-ranking intellectuals who aided the Soviet government, or apparatchiks (Boym, 129)—and there existed many restrictions regarding the consolidation or separation of space in communal apartments (Brodsky). For instance, stipulations outlined that families could not erect walls within their own apartments because it gave them more rooms than they were assigned, despite the fact that the amount of space they “owned” would not change (Brodsky).

It was difficult, if not impossible, to move or better one’s living conditions. One could move within their own city fairly easily, so long as residency permits were altered accordingly, but one could not receive permission to live outside of their city without proof that he had already been given a job in that new area; and jobs in other cities would typically not be assigned without a propiska from that new city (Colgate University). As such, the primary means of bettering one’s circumstances was through establishing new connections (often through influence via marriage or favors, known as blat), achieving some higher office in a white collar profession, or volunteering for extremely hard labor in some undesirable position and being granted dormitory housing by a state-run business (Colgate University).

In general, Soviet leaders used kommunalki and the housing system, in conjunction with a strengthening of the nation’s passport system, as tactics to control the USSR’s urban population (Boym, 129; Harris, 584). The fact that housing was subsidized influenced many Soviet citizens to regard the government as a protective provider, making them more willing to obey its multitude of inane housing regulations without question and simply try to work the system as much as possible to better their individual circumstances (Colgate University). And this likely prevented many people from questioning other actions taken by the government during this time. This not-so-subtle and yet disguised governmental control exercised a considerable amount of influence over the cultural development of Russia during the Communist period (Harris 584).  In a manner of speaking, the aim of the Soviet regime during this time was to force upon the population a utopian ideology through a dramatic redefinition of the conceptualization of space. This began with Lenin’s original plan to distribute spatial area to each person and family based on a geometric definition of equality rather than an idea of the necessity of private space; so long as each person received their allotted area, nothing about the area mattered—its design, its location, and whether or not the room was isolated from the surroundings were irrelevant (Boym, 124-125). As more and more people were crammed into irregularly arranged plots within kommunalki, their lives suddenly became public, and they suffered from the lack of privacy that came with living in such close quarters with so many other families (Boym, 125; Rubenshtein). While at best a single person could live with around ten other occupants of different social classes, as Joseph Brodsky did during his early years, it was not uncommon for groups of twenty-five to one hundred people to live in the same kommunalka. People knew their neighbors much more intimately than they desired. For instance, Lev Rubenshtein, in his essay “Communal Pulp Fiction,” could recount for his readers minute details about his neighbors’ sexual practices, drinking habits, hopes and dreams, occupations (or lack thereof), and interpersonal relations. It was extremely difficult to have guests over, especially when they could be kicked out by one’s neighbors after eleven at night. Some people would occasionally walk into the rooms of their neighbors unannounced, while others would lie in the hallways, causing their neighbors to trip over them (Rubenshtein).

These conditions created an entirely new community atmosphere and “social order” out of the kommunalka, which, as Rubenshtein explains, was like a town in and of itself. Citizens began to grudgingly (or perhaps unconsciously, as new generations were born into the

Soviet era) accept the Soviet collective mentality. Utopian terms such as “places of communal use” and “mutual responsibility” became commonplace among the people, who regarded them with simultaneous feelings of pride and disgust (Boym, 123-124). However, in many cases there was no sense of community loyalty; one’s neighbors could not necessarily be trusted, as many would be willing to act as snitches and report small housing offenses to the government for benefits or praise (Rubenshtein). And if this constant surveillance was not enough, there were always the regular check-ups made by the superintendents of each apartment building and the janitors, or dvorniki, installed by the Soviet Housing Committee to ensure that housing regulations were upheld (Boym, 129; Bed and Sofa).

Yet despite all of the complaints that people could make about the Soviet communal living system, it seems that some people in the modern post-Soviet age miss it. Before I traveled to Russia this summer on the St. Petersburg trip, all I could simply do was wonder how. One day, in conversation with my host mother, I asked her about kommunalki, assuming that she had lived in one at some point in her life. She told me that she had never actually lived in what she would define as a kommunalka, although she knew many people who did. But she explained that those filthy, jammed apartments were what many people called home. That, in her opinion, was what these people truly missed. Generations upon generations were born and raised in communal environments, and as they grow older and watch Russia attempt to take its place in the materialistic modern world, they look back to the past and long to return to the “traditional” family values and ties of their youth. A set of interviews by journalist Brigid McCarthy with two former Soviet citizens corroborated my host mother’s sentiments. One of the two interviewees, Valentina Baskina, described her childhood experience as one that was uncomfortable but tolerable because there was nothing to which she could compare it (McCarthy). She grew up around many friends in a place where children were a collective responsibility, and she cherished the memories of her old life (McCarthy). The other interviewee, Andrei Barbje, described his childhood as one he enjoyed and missed when his family finally moved into a larger apartment in 1978 (McCarthy). He learned to respect and consider the impact of his actions on others from the residents of his kommunalka, who, as he explained, established detailed sets of communal rules and spent holidays together to unify the many families in the apartment (McCarthy). Children of the Soviet period made the most out of what they were given: they could invite friends over to play; they

listened to stories about the former lives of elders living in their apartments, who were anything and everything from artisans to soldiers to intellectuals; and, with the inspiration of Soviet cartoons such as “A Communal Story” by Alexsei Shelmanov, they could daydream and make up adventures of their own with the meager resources they had. It made sense how older Russian generations, those former Soviet citizens, could have fond memories of these times, despite the conditions in which they lived.

As my conversations with local Russians revealed, and, oddly enough, through non-Soviet foreign films such as the French Les Poupées Russes, many people still live in kommunalki today. However, those who do, it seems, tend to be either older or unable to afford a single-family apartment of their own. While the living conditions within these apartments have improved considerably since the fall of the Soviet regime, there exists a stigma associated with the idea of communal living amongst younger, post-Soviet-born generations. For instance, when we asked our twenty two-year-old language instructor at Moscow State University whether or not she had or currently lived in a kommunalka, she responded with a harsh “no” and a look of disgust. It is difficult to explain such a negative attitude towards the kommunalki among the youth. Is it a simple response to the unhygienic and far-too-public environment of the communal apartment, or is it something more? Could it perhaps be revulsion towards aforementioned Soviet ideals and an acceptance of Western materialism and the idea of the necessity of private space as opposed to the public sphere?

With that said, one major question remains: how will the kommunalki and the institution of communal living develop in the future? Their time has already passed, their popularity peaked. They are diminishing in number, and at this point, modern-day Russia and its citizens are left with a choice: are they to eliminate them entirely and remove the anomalous blending of public and private space that so reminds them of the constant eye of communism? Or are they to preserve them as historical monuments, or even as viable future housing options? Right now, so soon after the fall of the Soviet regime, it is hard to say. Russia is still trying to stabilize itself and identify its place amongst the world’s powers, as well as adjust to and balance with their own traditional family values the materialistic culture of Western influences. Only time will tell at this point, but I personally hope they keep at least a few around, for they stand as a testament to human cooperation, perseverance, and tolerance of severe governmental encroachment on individual rights that should never be forgotten.

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Adam Mickiewicz in St. Petersburg (Jennifer Moore)

On a little street off of Nevsky Prospekt in the center of St. Petersburg there is a little monument to the Polish nationalist writer, Adam Mickiewicz.  Next to the simple monument is a Polish language school named after the respected poet.  They commemorate Mickiewicz’s two-month sojourn in St. Petersburg in 1824.    Mickiewicz was born on December 24, 1798 in Zaosie in the Russian federation, then the Third Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  He died on November 26, 1855 in Constantinople.   In his poems regarding Poland and Russia, Mickiewicz focused mainly on patriotic themes and the nations’ fantastic, dynamic, and turbulent pasts.  He was the poetic leader during the Romantic and patriotic movements in

Poland and rallied the masses through his poetic pen by rallying them around nationalism.  The Russian city of St. Petersburg, its culture, and its people altered his ideas about nationalism, and the significance of his short stay there had implications for the ways in which this great poet was commemorated both in Russia and in Poland. and added to his writing style.  Firstly the background of Mickiewicz will be detailed, as well why he was exiled to St. Petersburg, what he did there, who he met, and finally how meeting those people and seeing the city affected and impacted
In 1817, Warsaw was still under Russian rule.  Many Polish people felt isolated and suffered economically, socially and psychologically.  Mickiewicz was a patriot; he loved Poland, and was disheartened by the dissolution of his Polish homeland.  He grew inspiration from his fellow suffering Poles and joined with his like-minded friend Tomasz Zan, as well as others, to form a secret society, the Philomaths (Lovers of Knowledge).  The organization initially concentrated on education and was split into two factions; mathematics/scientific and literary.  However, by 1819 the increasing suffering of the Polish people pushed some of the organizers into taking a more active role in helping Poland regain independence.  Unfortunately, for Mickiewicz such activism was banned by the Russian government and led to an investigation of secret student organizations.  A large number of activists were arrested, including Mickiewicz.  After his trial, in 1824 Mickiewicz was banished to central Russia for his pro-independence beliefs.  After Mickiewicz was exiled and went on a journey through Russia and Europe, his pro-independence works were written and circulated. his life.  Lastly, the significance of the monuments in Krakow, Warsaw, Lviv, and St. Petersburg, and the significance of their placement will be discussed.

Prison life changed the tone of Mickiewicz poems.  Before prison the keynote of his poems was disappointed love but after prison he concentrated on the suffering patriotism concerning Poland (Tarnowski).   He was then exiled in Russia where he wrote sad but extremely evocative pieces.  During his time in St. Petersburg and Russia he developed his pieces with wonderful “patriotism, inspiration, and an artistic finish” that was a step above anything else he had yet written (Tarnowski).  In 1832 Mickiewicz wrote the poem “Dziady” (“Дзяды- Forefathers”) He did not glorify St. Petersburg,  but represented it from the viewpoint of the locals in its founding years.    The Russian people did not want to move the capital to St. Petersburg, a city located on a barely inhabitable swamp.  Therefore the people thought the city was built by Satan, an inference to Peter the Great:

Rome created by the hand of man,

Venice created by the gods;

But everyone would agree with me,

What made PetersburgSatan.

 

Рим создан человеческой рукою,

Венеция богами создана;

Но каждый согласился бы со мною,

Что Петербург построил сатана

In spite of the obstacles and loss of life, the Russian people endured and accomplished this huge feat of building a capital city on swampland.  Peter’s “Window to the West” became a reality; Russia was now connected to the West through its port and large fleet of ships.  Russians were also introduced, often forcibly, to western ideas and technology thus improving the living conditions of the country. Even with this new connection to the west, living in St. Petersburg was still difficult especially because of the terrible floods which occurred regularly in 1724, 1824, and 1924 (Petersburg).  Mickiewicz in fact arrived in St. Petersburg two days after the Neva flooded the city in 1824.  According to Pushkin, nature seemed to resist the creation of St. Petersburg by washing it, blowing it into the sea, trying to kill all the people.  Even through these seemingly unbelievable conditions, St. Petersburg and its people survived and continued to prosper.  In this poem Mickiewicz showed what the people had to overcome to build the magnificent capital.  The poem emphasized the hatred for Peter, referred to as ‘King of the Swamp.’  It also depicts, the new capital, St. Petersburg, was not a place of the people.  Its first residents were the nobles who made up Peter’s court and government.  They were forced to move to the new capital, build grand mansions on the main canal in order to display to the country and the world the wealth and new prosperity of ‘modern’ Russia.

The wind, fog and mud constantly,

And the sky is sending a cold or heat,

Wrong, as a wild temper tyrant.

No people, no, that king of the swamp

Stood and said: “Here we will build!”

And laid the Empire stronghold,

Currently the capital, but not the city for the people.

Здесь ветер, мгла и слякоть постоянно,

И небо шлет лишь холод или зной,

Неверное, как дикий нрав тирана.

Не люди, нет, то царь среди болот

Стал и сказал: “Тут строиться мы будем!”

И заложил империи оплот,

Себе столицу, но не город людям.

 Although it is natural for the Poles to admire Mickiewicz, other states respected him as well.  After Adam Mickiewicz’s death, in cities across Europe, ideas about erecting monuments in honor of the poet began.  People from the Polish diaspora wanted to honor his life, by the  means of spreading their cultural and nationalist views throughout Europe.   In response, statues have been erected in Kraków and Warsaw in Poland, in Lviv in Ukraine, and in St. Petersburg in Russia.  Mickiewicz never visited the city of Krakow, but due to the insistence of the mayor a sculpture was placed in the Main Market Square of Krakow. Once the city (Krakow) was decided upon, a contest was held in order to decide who would be honored as the sculptor.  First prize was awarded to the famed sculptor Cyprian Godebski, a professor at the Imperial Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg.  However, it was Teodor Rygier, a little known sculptor, who won the third and final competition for this project.  He sculpted the grand statue that now stands in the Main Market Square in the Old Town (Stare Miasto) district of Kraków.  The statue has four allegoric

groups that symbolize the Polish “Motherland (from the face of the monument along Sienna Street), Science (facing north), Courage (facing Sukiennice Hall) and Poetry (facing Church of St. Wojciech, south)” (Wikipedia).  Each side of the statue signifies a portion of Mickiewicz’s life; his love of country and science; the courage he used to face his adversaries and his poetic talents.  At the pedestal of the monument the inscription reads: “To Adam Mickiewicz, the Nation.”  This inscription as well as the layout of the statue itself, portrays the deep national pride the Poles feel towards Mickiewicz and his work.  In 1890, two years after the monument was built, 35 years after his death, his remains were brought to and laid to rest in St. Leonard’s Crypt under the Wawel Cathedral (Wikipedia).

Krakowskie Przedmieście is one of the best known and most prestigious streets in the capital of Poland, Warsaw.  Here stands the monument to Adam Mickiewicz built in 1897-1898 by the sculptor Cyrian Godebski, who was overlooked in Krakow but was given the honor of constructing a monument in Warsaw.   The monument is surrounded by historic palaces, churches, and manor-houses, located in the center of Warsaw. At this time, the Russians still had influence over Poland but once the Warsaw intelligentsia became aware of the project the Russians relented and permitted its construction.  The statue is a representation of Mickiewicz standing high, with his head slightly raised and his right hand placed across his chest resting on his heart.  To commemorate the poet’s 100th birthday, the monument was unveiled on December 24, 1898.  After the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, the Nazis destroyed the monument. Lviv, Ukraine was another location chosen to honor Mickiewicz.  The column is situated in the center of the historic Adam Mickiewicz Square; one of the most visited cultural sightseeing places.  For Poles living in Lviv, this was a symbol of great national consciousness and Polish pride (AMML).

Compared to the two other monuments, the landmark in St. Petersburg honoring Mickiewicz is much smaller and not as elegant as the others.  It stands in front of the Polish Language school honoring Adam Mickiewicz.  While the statue stands in a back alley, it is close to the center of St. Petersburg in front of the language school off of Nevsky prospekt.   A regular tourist would have great difficulty finding or knowing who the statue represents. The school was built on the corner of the alley across from the Fontanka River.  The full name of the school is the State Educational Institution Secondary School Number 216 for the In-Depth Study of the Polish Language at the Adam Mickiewicz Central District of St. Petersburg.  In 1991, the school received the status of advanced study in Polish language.  The school is considered a multicultural educational institution.  Even though the school focuses on Polish language and culture, it also incorporates the patriotic upbringing of the younger generation with historical examples of St. Petersburg, Leningrad, and Russia as a whole (Школа No 216).

In 1824 while in St. Petersburg, Mickiewicz spent two months meeting famous Russian writers and visiting their homes. It was during this period he became good friends with Alexander Pushkin and the inner circle of Russian literary geniuses including Aleksandr A. Bestuzhev and Kondraty F. Ryleev.  Bestuzhev and Ryleev were two leaders within the literary circle of St. Petersburg and were conspirators who initiated a republicanist revolt against the tsar in 1825.    Mickiewicz and the Russian writers had strong influences on one another.  It was these men who showed Mickiewicz that the Russian people “were not to be equated with those who ruled them” meaning the Russian people did not necessarily agree with what the Russian nobility and rulers stood for (Koropeckyj).   This was very much part of the Romantic Nationalist movement which argued that  state derived its political legitimacy from the unity of the people it governed.  This unity derived from the common language, race, culture, religion, and customs of a nation.    Romanticism “opened a window to their nation’s past and folk and at the same time offered visions of liberty for the individual as well as a people (Koropeckyj).” While Mickiewicz was born in the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth, he mostly related and connected to the Polish people and their nation more so than the Lithuanian people.

Despite the two writers only spending a minuscule amount of time with each other, Mickiewicz clearly felt strongly towards Pushkin and looked to him not only as a writer but as a friend.  In the obituary Mickiewicz wrote for Pushkin, he claimed that he “observed in him a character too much given to fleeting impressions and sometimes shallow, but always generous, noble-minded, and capable of passion. His faults seemed to be connected to the circumstances in which he grew up, while what was good in him came from the depths of his heart.”  (Dixon, A Translation).  At the end of the obituary Mickiewicz signed it “A Friend of Pushkin.”  Tensions and a general distrust have existed between the Poles and Russians for many years.   These tensions were due to at best border disagreements and at worst various periods of Russian occupation.    The relationship that developed between the Polish Mickiewicz and the Russian Pushkin was an unlikely one. Mickiewicz was from a country with a “moral mission: to regain independence from the government that so many of the Russian literary figures criticized” (Dixon, Pushkin and Mickiewicz).  Pushkin recognized the difference between the two poets:  “the great difference that separates us comes from our opposed positions: you are the poet of an oppressed nation, and this decides your superiority over me. You would not believe with what joy I would change places with you (cited in Dixon, Pushkin and Mickiewicz).”  It is quite amazing that these two people who came from opposing counties could become friends and influence one another.  Although Pushkin and Mickiewicz were committed patriots to their respective countries, Mickiewicz was considered a prophet who became the voice and inspiration for the Polish people. After his visit to St. Petersburg, revolutions began in Europe in 1848 and during that time he moved to Italy to help organize Polish legions to fight Austria over contested areas in the south of Poland (Lituanica).  Later, a war between Russia and Turkey began to revive hopes to re-establish the republic of Poland- Lithuania.

Adam Mickiewicz was considered to be a “gente lithuanus, natione polonus” [Lithuanian person, a native of Poland] (Lituanica).

Although born on Lithuanian land, he was always considered a true Pole.  Adam Mickiewicz is remembered today in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia as a talented and amazing poet as well as a courageous man.   Through his pen united the Polish people through the use of common history and powerful writing his artistic style was influenced by the places he visited and the people he met.

 

Works cited

 

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The Hare and the Flood: Forces of Nature at Work in St. Petersburg (Jessica Parks)

On the way out to Peter and Paul Fortress, along Ioannovsky Bridge, a 58-centimeter high statue of a rabbit stands on one of the pilings in the water. Marks on the piling indicate the height of some of the floods that inundated St. Petersburg in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This monument, referred to as “The Hare Escaping Flooding,” stands for the people and animals that perished in such floods (Saint-Petersburg.com). Other than this scanty information, the origins of this whimsical statue remain largely a mystery. Made from a mixture of selumine and aluminum (“Unusual Monuments in St. Petersburg”), it was placed in 2003 during one of the many renovations of Ioannovsky Bridge (Saint-Petersburg.com). Not much information about the sculptor exists other than his name–V. Petrovichiev (BaikalNature). This statue, however enigmatic, connects to larger concepts in Russian history and culture–for example, the impact of flooding in St. Petersburg, as well as the prevalence of the hare in Russian culture as a symbolic figure. The reactions of people to this statue reflect its small stature and whimsical nature.

The broader location of the statue has much significance. Ioannovsky Bridge, as its many renovations indicate, is the oldest bridge in the city, and was built in the same year as the city itself, if not exactly in its present location (St. Petersburg Encyclopedia). Ioannovsky Bridge extends to Peter and Paul
Fortress, the point of origin for the city. The island upon which Peter and Paul Fortress stands is known as “Hare Island” (Zayachy Ostrov) due to the large number of hares that used to live there (Saint-Petersburg.com). A local legend ties these components together: during a flood, one of the hares from the island supposedly jumped into Peter the Great’s boat to avoid the rising waters (Saint-Petersburg.com). The statue symbolizes this legend quite well; the hare statue stands on a piling that rises far above the rest. Thus, this decade-old statue not only sits in the oldest part of St. Petersburg, but it also ties together the significance of the sites around it.

Beyond this basic legend regarding Peter the Great, hares have enjoyed a long and deep cultural symbolism in Russian history. Hares appeared frequently in Russian animal tales as a “cowardly animal.” As with all other animals in stories, storytellers used stock phrases to refer to hares, such as “the hare who runs away,” “the little gray fellow,” or “the rascally hare” (Sokolov, 436). The hare certainly lived up to these characterizations in folktales; for example, in a tale entitled “Who is More Cowardly Than the Hare?,” a hare on the verge of drowning himself due to his cowardliness chose not to after observing that a frog was afraid of him (Haney, 63). In another tale, “The Fox, the Hare, and the Cock,” a fox living in an ice house drove out a hare living in a bark house when the ice house melted. The hare sat around in despair, until a cock came and drove out the fox with a scythe (Gerber, 28). Hares were not always simply cowards, however; as the phrase “the rascally hare” suggests, hares could also act swiftly and trickily. In the tale “The Fox and the Hare,” the hare is “poor in strength, [but] he’s frisky at running and full of youthful pranks” (Haney, 33). This tricky nature of the hare was not necessarily negative; as noted by Russian folktale scholar Vladimir Propp,

“Trickery presupposes the dominance of the crafty over the stupid or simple. From our point of view, trickery is morally reprehensible. In animal tales, on the contrary, it arouses delight, as a form of expression of dominance of the weak over the strong” (Propp, 298). Trickery, in other words, formed an essential part of survival and therefore did not necessarily appear as a negative quality. Thus, the legend regarding the hare who jumped into Peter the Great’s boat follows the tradition of Russian folk tales. Elements of the legend may have even stemmed from the symbolism in Russian folk tales. The hare may have jumped into Peter the Great’s boat out of cowardice, but the statue celebrates the “rascally hare’s” instinct to survive.

These characteristics associated with hares–trickery, cowardice, fleetness–have endured up to the present. One example of the “rascally hare” appeared in the Soviet children’s cartoon Nu, Pogodi!, which followed the adventures of a wolf attempting to capture and presumably eat a hare. While this show bears some comparison with the American cartoon Tom and Jerry, the characters of the wild hungry wolf and the tricky hare conceivably could have been drawn from old Russian folk tales. Other more negative examples of the hare as a coward rather than a trickster have occurred more recently. In 2009, a series of “hare” protests occurred in St. Petersburg in response to increased local transportation fees. The term “hare” (zayats) has become slang for a person who uses public transport without paying by dodging the fees (Chernov). The forty or so protestors wore hare masks and stenciled hare skulls on the walls of the office of the Transport Committee. This incident shows that the negative aspects of the character of the hare have endured just as much as the more positive “trickster” aspects. A hare, a bear and a leopard all stand as mascots for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, and nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky had this to say about them: “The bear is the dumbest animal, the leopard is bloodthirsty, and the hare a coward who always runs away” (Bratersky). Thus, both the negative and positive characteristics of the hare have endured. These characteristics made it a much more appropriate choice for the statue than, for example, a fox or a bear (both of which also appeared quite often in Russian animal tales).

Besides the wider cultural significance of the hare, the statue also addresses a vital part of St. Petersburg’s history: flooding. Flooding has continually shaped the physical and cultural landscape of St. Petersburg, from the very first floods that washed away the flimsy dwellings of Peter the Great’s forced laborers (New York Times) to the devastating flood of 1824 that killed more than 200 people (Patterson). Pushkin immortalized the flood of 1824 in his poem “The Bronze Horseman.” In November 2010, St. Petersburg experienced its 308th flood (“Russia Beyond the Headlines”), nearly a flood a year since the city has existed. In 2011, the Russian government officially completed and opened a dam meant to protect St. Petersburg from rising water (The Voice of Russia). This reflects an ongoing desire to control the forces of nature in St. Petersburg; after all, in 1703, Peter the Great sought to engineer a city on a most inhospitable piece of land, persevering despite those foreboding first floods. More than three centuries later, the Russian government finally completed a project that would further tame the forces of nature and ensure the continued flourishing of St. Petersburg. Plaques around the city indicate the high water marks of some of the past floods (Patterson). With these constant reminders, flooding has also managed to dominate the cultural landscape of the city. The tiny statue of “The Hare Escaping Flooding,” then, does not stand entirely on its own but rather makes up a larger part of this flood commemoration trend.

Interestingly enough, however, when compared to other flood markers, this hare statue stands apart in one important respect. The marks on the piling that represent the heights of floodwaters are not very visible at all, in contrast with the stark line on, for example, the plaque marking the infamous flood of 1824. The visual emphasis of the hare statue is therefore on the hare and not necessarily on the piling (and faint marks) below it. The attitude of the crowds of Russians and tourists alike crossing Ioannovsky Bridge reinforces this assertion; these crowds regard the pilings immediately around the statue as lucky landing spots for tossed kopeks. The pilings even occasionally serve as a climbing spot for carefree children playing in the waters below the bridge in the summer. Thus, this mysterious statue, while representing larger concepts, has managed to root itself in people’s minds as a cute and whimsical spot to throw coins at before continuing on to Peter and Paul Fortress.

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Religion and Atheism in Soviet Russia: The Search for a Cultural Narrative (Aaron Buzek)

Soviet religious policy is highly representative of the reactionary and contradictory spirit of Russian history. The search for a cohesive Russian cultural identity has been plagued by the struggle between east and west, past and future, and what is considered truly Russian (or in this case Soviet) and what is a seen as a threat to their nation. In order to understand the place of religion in Soviet Russia one must examine the respective cultural value both before and after the October Revolution of 1917. In investigating this dichotomy, one can begin to understand the difficulty surrounding the search for a cohesive cultural identity: a search that has been raging throughout the history of Russia.

Before the revolution and Bolshevik rule, religion was of paramount importance in Russia; the morality and everyday actions of people were highly influenced by religious belief. This private spiritual and moral sway of religion was not the only influence on Russian life, though. Orthodox Christianity’s influence on society as a whole must also be noted to fully understand the impact of Soviet religious policy.

A cursory glance at the skyline of Saint Petersburg is all that is needed to impart the feeling that religion is a major facet of Russian society. Saint Isaac’s and the spire of Peter and Paul Cathedral rise above the rest of the low-lying city and frequent walks down Nevsky Prospect presents the magnificent structures of Kazan Cathedral and The Church on Spilled Blood. Each and every church was extraordinary in its own way, both inside and out. A phenomenal amount of money, in addition to artistic and architectural innovation, was poured into the construction of Russia’s many churches. Churches were one of the status symbols of the Tsars, a way to show their might and wealth, as well as a way to contribute to the cultural development of their society.

File:Kazan Cathedral, St. Petersburg, Russia.jpg

Kazan Cathedral: Later used to house the Museum of Atheism in Leningrad (Source: Joe North, Wikimedia Creative Commons 2.0)

Despite the omnipresence of religion, the Bolsheviks, and their ideological forefathers, believed that religion was inherently incompatible with their version of socialism. To Marx, religion was an ‘opiate’ that kept the masses blind to their suffering and enslavement under the capitalist yoke (Marx 1). They believed that it undermined their core values of science and technological progress and hindered their movement away from the backward tendencies of Tsarist Russia. Essentially religion was in direct contradiction to the cultural narrative that the Soviets were working to introduce. From its onset, the Soviet government mandated the complete separation of church and state. Starting in the 1920s, the Soviet government began what would become a long, drawn-out, and ultimately unsuccessful struggle to suppress religion and promote atheism, a key component of the new Soviet identity.

In the beginning, the efforts of the state to suppress religion were masked under the guise of societal healing, not so much in a purely anti-religious manner. In 1923, the government looted a great number of churches, taking with them uncountable, irreplaceable religious artifacts. This was done under the pretense of helping the starving—this was an effective and intelligent strategy, as protest by the churches or followers would appear to be greedy and unwilling to help the needy (Lebina 43). The actual role that these artifacts played in feeding the poor, however, is not entirely clear. Regardless, this action sent a clear message to the religious community: the wellbeing of society trumps that of religion. In addition to these actions, the government secularized marriage and death, and no religious holidays were officially recognized or supported by the state, although they were replaced by days of rest throughout the country(41). The secularization of these prominent cultural events was a powerful first step in replacing the religious aspect of society with the new Soviet narrative.

The strength bestowed to the community by religious holidays spurred the government to develop a campaign which targeted these traditions. The state sponsored “Komsomol” Christmas and Easter, which responded to local religious celebrations with atheist propaganda and a mocking view of the celebrations that threatened the centralization desired by the state (Lebina 44). The Komsomol push was unsuccessful, though, because much of the importance of these celebrations for the religious lay in the tradition and actions of the people. The state revamped its attempts at secularization by hosting celebrations completely separate from the holidays at clubs. This was an attempt to entice believers away from celebrating religious holidays. In addition to these parties, marches and parades were organized to promote atheism among the youth (45-47).

At the end of the 1920s there was a noticeable shift in the state’s attitude toward religion. It began to remove religious holidays and replace them with Soviet holidays. Eventually this culminated in the abolition of Christmas and even New Year’s celebrations (though the latter was revoked in 1947). Christmas and New Year’s trees were made illegal and random raids were conducted to ensure obedience to the new law (Lebina 59). These actions against the two biggest Russian holidays were a huge step in the Soviet’s attempt to rewrite the Russian cultural narrative. These sweeping reforms greatly decreased the active and open religious participation of a large quantity of the population.

Collectivization of public life also furthered the suppression of religion. No religious symbology, i.e. icons, were allowed in common areas of collective housing, and people were frequently mocked for publically performing religious rituals. Food rations had a similar effect. The limited food supply available to the majority of the population prevented them from preparing special holiday foods (Lebina 57). Finally, the introduction of an uninterrupted work week limited workers’ free time (55). Having Sunday as the only day off discouraged people from attending church and made celebrating holidays much more cumbersome and challenging.

There was a revival of religion throughout the USSR despite the introduction of these measures meant to suppress religious activity and belief (although it is important to note that tens of thousands of believers and clergymen were sent to the gulags during this time period). This restoration was due to the outbreak of World War II. Stalin used religion to unite the Soviet people and instill a sense of hope during a dark time. This relative lull in persecution lasted for the rest of Stalin’s rule, until 1953. However, during Khrushchev’s time in power and the period of de-Stalinization, there was a significant and intense revival of antireligious activity (Stone 297). By 1964, the number of operating churches, monasteries, and clergymen was roughly halved by the government(Lebina 81). Monasteries were the first target of the antireligious campaign, because they had no legal representation and were relatively removed from the public eye.  The state closed down numerous monasteries across the Soviet Union and prevented anyone younger than 30 joining a monastery (Shkarovskii 74). The latter measure is exemplary of many antireligious actions by the government because of its focus on preventing young people from becoming religious.

After the attack on the monasteries, the government turned its attention to the churches. The government initiated widespread tax hikes on churches and candle-making studios (a significant monetary supply for churches), as well as drastically cutting priest’s pay: this was an attempt to run churches into the ground economically (Shakrovskii 75). Additionally, churches had to register with the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA). The CRA was intended as a mediator between the church and state, as an enforcer of legislation regarding religious activity. This neutrality was a complete façade, as the CRA supported atheism and allowed regional authorities under their command to operate relatively independent of the law, with few checks on their activities. Although the main mission of the CRA was to provide administration to religious bodies, they also exercised control over atheist propaganda and had a substantial influence in developing legislation (Anderson 1).

In the final days of 1958, the government raided church libraries and fenced off and appropriated holy sites throughout the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1959, the government responded to outcry from the Church and allowed religious authorities to host an international convention of Orthodox Churches. However, due to prior weakening of the Russian Orthodox Church, the rest of the Orthodox community decided that these leaders were unfit for their duties (Shkarovskii 72-73).

This failed experiment substantially weakened the Orthodox Church’s position in Russian society and allowed the government to make further inroads against them. The government prohibited a good deal of churches from opening and increased KGB presence among the faithful. The government’s attempts to limit religious influence would prove to be futile as early as 1960, when a substantially higher proportion of Russians attended Easter service. One Muscovite noted that churches in Moscow were overflowing, forcing some attendees to stand outside the physical church (Shkarovskii 78). The state responded by introducing a much more vicious head of the CRA and closing more churches. Local police were encouraged to ignore acts of vandalism against churches and violence against church-goers.

Closure and limitation of theological schools, as well as additional tax hikes, took place in 1961. Now the Russian people were truly beginning to stir against these measures and took matters into their own hands by gathering data on persecution to use as a bargaining chip and founding underground churches, collectively known as the True Orthodox Church. The state made a final push in 1964, beginning intense atheistic schooling and increased the propaganda present in school. These measures were concentrated mostly in rural Russia, which was viewed as backward and primitive, the antithesis to the highly industrialized and technologically advanced picture that Soviet leaders had for their society (Stone 300-301). Science was emphasized over the belief in the supernatural and it became illegal to expose children and adolescents to religion or any religious thought (Stone 302).

File:Soyuz Voinstvuyushchikh Bezbozhnikov Membership Card.jpg

League of Militant Atheists Membership Card (Source: Anonymous Author, Wikimedia Creative Commons)

These measures were based on several factors including economic socialization and general control, both of which were seen to be undermined by religious belief. The international climate and pressure from abroad was also an important factor, and at the end of 1964, this pressure became enough to force the government to lay off significantly in their antireligious campaign. This shift between the 60s-70s and the late stage of Soviet rule can be seen in the presentation of the antireligious message in the Museum of Atheism in Leningrad. As late as 1974, the museum focused on the darkest side of religion, such as religious suppression and backwardness. A significant portion of the museum was dedicated to displaying numerous torture instruments used in religious persecutions such as the Spanish Inquisition. In 1981 a western visitor noticed that these exhibits were completely gone, and the general tone of the museum was much more subtle (Elliot 128). This exemplifies the shift from the Khrushchev era to the later stage of the Soviet Union. The state’s blatant and intense attacks against religion were unsuccessful and invited significant negative attention from abroad, resulting in a significantly toned down message. As the Soviet Union’s push to change the cultural identity began to falter (most seen in perestroika and glasnost) it was deemed necessary to begin cutting losses in an effort to recover ground the state had lost in the second half of the 20th century. This notably manifested itself in greater religious freedom and less influence from the government in this sphere of life.

Beginning in the mid-1960s there was a substantial movement toward protecting churches and old religious sites in the name of conserving history. This movement was also urged on by a desire for more tourism, positive international attention, and a more subtle presentation of atheism. This movement of religious persecution, from beginning to end, was eventually unsuccessful. Though there was a substantial decrease in churches and overt religious practice, the devout simply responded by practicing religion in a more private way. Now, in the post-Soviet era, there is a general trend toward increased religiousness, and there is also a general reluctance to identify oneself as an atheist (Kublitskaia 51).

In their search for a cultural identity and narrative, the Russian people have followed a winding, convoluted path. From the westernization effort of Peter the Great to the revival of the ‘true’ Russian spirit of rural peasant culture, to the battle between the intelligentsia and the church and government, Russia has never been able to maintain a true identity. In their great experiment, the Soviets tried to manifest their own identity, but it ultimately proved weak and groundless. Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the modern nation of Russia is still struggling to define itself. The church has made a huge comeback, finding great support from the government and a significant portion of the population. It is seen as a part of that evasive concept of something that is ‘truly Russian’. The Russian people are again attending church in large numbers. While I was in Russia, I got a lot of support for wearing my baptismal crucifix; I felt that many of the Russians who reacted to this were pleased to see an American supporting the Orthodox Church.

Although widespread support for the church is returning, it is certainly presenting itself in a contradictory manner. Russia wishes to present itself as a progressive, modern democracy, yet it steadfastly suppresses the gay community and carries out clearly partisan attacks on Putin’s challengers (most notably the recent actions against Alexei Navalny). It is worth noting that the church is one of the main proponents of the anti-gay stance that has been taken by the government. Clearly, Russia has not yet discovered its own cultural identity, and it is hard to see that happening any time in the near future. Russia’s cultural narrative may very well be a perpetual search for one.

Works Cited 

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Souvenirs (Shannon Callinan)

Souvenirs are an integral but easily overlookable aspect of a culture, defining not just how others view a society, but how that society views itself and chooses to present itself to its citizens and the world. As a general rule, souvenirs represent the intersection of these two views – they show not just what foreign visitors are willing to buy (and, thus, how these items represent foreign opinions on a certain culture), they represent what native vendors are willing to sell (and, thus, they show how a particular culture might represent itself).

The most obvious impact on what sorts of souvenirs are sold is what a tourist is willing to buy – like all businesses, the souvenir sellers need to make money. From the buyer’s end, a souvenir is a mark of authenticity, proof that they actually visited a given place (Brown and Turley, 17). It also acts as a visual reminder – a sort of memory aid – of the trip (Belk, 32). It must therefore remind the tourist of the trip, either by having some sort of great memory attached to it or by being somehow representative of the place visited. An ordinary spoon, for example, fails to demonstrate the cultural gap between the home and the destination; it might have been bought anywhere, and so it fails to act as a reminder of the unique differences experienced while abroad (Hitchcock, 4). Suppose, however, one has a painted (or khokhloma) spoon. These are made out of light wood, rather than metal; they are often brightly colored, with golden handles and red-and-gold floral designs against a black bowl, rather than monochrome silver.  Such spoons are out of the ordinary; having one on display forces one to remember where the spoon was bought, and, by association, it brings up related memories of the journey. Further, since souvenirs are frequently given as gifts to family and friends who did not come along, they must evoke the visited culture to those who may have very little actual experience of it. This creates a level of stereotyping in souvenir buying – if, when one thinks of Russian souvenirs, one thinks of matryoshki, one is going to buy matryoshki to remind oneself and one’s friends of Russia (Graburn, xiii). This leads to the perpetuation of the matryoshka-Russia association, which then influences others to buy them as souvenirs (Brown and Turley, 18). In this way, the preconceived notions of a culture or country greatly impact what sorts of souvenirs a tourist is likely to buy when visiting.

Khokhloma spoons

Khokhloma spoons. Source: Finding Frenchie

Sellers perpetuate this cycle. Since they know that tourists expect certain kinds of souvenirs, many sellers have shaped their goods to fit tourist expectations (Belk 38). Even if similar goods are sold to both tourists and locals, the tourist items will be different (if only subtly) because of this attempt to appeal to foreign tastes (Hitchcock, 11). Further, knowing that the buyers will have certain restrictions on what sorts of goods they can bring home (for example, size limits on airplanes), goods are often modified to fit the practical needs of tourists (Graburn, xiii). As an example, Mariia Girgor’evna Chereiskaia notes that the ceramics made in the town of Skopin in the Riazan region of Russia have gotten smaller over time in order to comply with modern tastes and the requirements of traveling (Chereiskaia).

Nonetheless, souvenirs are not solely indicative of tourists’ tastes, with sellers one-sidedly kowtowing to the needs and desires of buyers. Nelson H. Graburn characterizes them as a physical pidgin language, a simplification that allows intercultural communication. Just as pidgins take input from both languages, souvenirs are shaped by the cultures of both buyer and seller. The sellers and producers draw not only on stereotypes of the tourists and what they think tourists will want, but also on their own social taboos and customs (Grabin, xiii).

St Petersburg Market

Center for the Support of the Arts of St. Petersburg. Source: Scott99

Like most major cities, St. Petersburg and Moscow are peppered with souvenir shops – most of them small, crowded stores filled with overpriced goods. These are not the most popular places for tourists to buy their souvenirs. Instead, most seem to go to the outdoor markets – the Center for the Support of the Arts of St. Petersburg (Tsentr Podderzhki Iskusstv Sankt-Peterburga) near the Church on Spilled Blood in St. Petersburg, or the Ismailovo souvenir market in Moscow. These markets offer an invaluable opportunity to observe the meaning of souvenirs in Russian culture. At a basic level, the interactions between vendors and tourists, and the range of goods being sold has implications for Russian nationalism. Focusing more on souvenirs, the genre of Soviet memorabilia indicates contemporary attitudes towards USSR. Finally, more specifically, the existence and style of a particular series of matryoshka dolls can shed light on modern Russian stereotyping of Jewish people.

Many vendors play up the authenticity of their goods. Looking at a lacquer box, for example, will elicit a lecture from the vendor on the art form itself, the significance of Palekh, Kholuy, Fedosinko, or Mstyora (the four main centers of lacquer box production (Chereskaia)), an explanation of the fairy tale or scene painted on it, and a run down of the more popular motifs. Most vendors have magnifying glasses on hand, to show buyers the subtle differences in quality between similar boxes or their authentic handmade provenance. This sort of behavior extends beyond lacquer boxes – sellers of Soviet memorabilia often explain to potential buyers the background of a pin or medal (always with assurances that these items are real, and had been given to actual people in the USSR – that they are neither replicas nor surpluses). One vendor at Izmailovo advertised his stall by shouting, in both English and Russian, that his goods were not Chinese-made. This all makes good business sense – tourists typically look for locally produced goods from the country visited, as opposed to cheap, mass-produced goods made specifically for tourists (Bunn, 182). Thus, by specifically advertising authenticity, souvenir vendors can expect to sell more goods.

Nevertheless, there are some nationalistic undertones that cannot be explained by good salesmanship alone. Many of the historical lectures I received came after my purchase had been finalized – especially in Izmailovo. At this point, there was no real need for vendors to pitch their goods to me; I could not exactly ask for a refund at that point, and referrals, especially in Izmailovo, would be next to impossible – the whole market is so immense, so devoid of signs or real landmarks, that it would be immensely difficult for even the most satisfied of customers to direct a friend to a specific stall. Further, during their lectures on authenticity, many vendors were quick to give out potentially negative information. One used a magnifying glass to point out the difference in paint quality and materials in lacquer boxes as an explanation for price differences. There was no attempt to upsell, just a genuine explanation about why some boxes are objectively better than others. This all implies a love of the items being sold and the histories behind them beyond what would be strictly necessary to get a sale.

The discounts given also indicated Russian nationalistic pride. Generally, the souvenir markets are open to haggling. Decent discounts can be had by mentioning a lack of money, or status as a student, or even just by suggesting a lower price. Better bargains, though, are had by tying oneself to the area. Attempting to speak in Russian, for example, is one of the easiest ways to get money knocked off; saying that one is a student at a specific local university (St. Petersburg State or Moscow State, in my case) is just as good. This indicates a level of national – or perhaps local – pride. Those who identify themselves as insiders by using rubles, speaking Russian, or attending local schools are treated preferentially to the outsiders, who pay in dollars or Euros, make no attempt to speak Russian, and have often been bussed in by a travel agency. Thus, one can conclude that the vendors’ behavior indicates a general sense of national pride in modern Russia.

Beyond the behavior of the vendors themselves, the actual items for sale indicate a great deal about Russian attitudes. One of the more common ‘genres’ of Russian souvenirs is Soviet memorabilia: cups and t-shirts with the sickle and star or hammer and sickle, mugs and coasters bearing transparencies of Soviet realist paintings and propaganda, even actual Soviet-era artifacts such as military uniforms, medals, pins, etc. The vast majority of these items paint the Soviet Union in a generally positive light. The uniforms and medals, for example, call upon the image of the noble, heroic soldier, a war-hero, someone who fought for his homeland. Medals are almost exclusively positive icons – they celebrate some desirable trait, like dedication, or sacrifice for the higher good, or being particularly productive. Uniforms and associated paraphernalia likewise indicate a positive outlook – these are items meant to be used and worn (greatcoats, for example, seem more common than full uniforms; all-purpose bags were more common than highly specific military equipment). The presence of these items indicate not just that tourists are willing to buy them – vendors have to be willing to sell things that may glorify the Soviet Union. Germans, for example, would probably never stand for SS greatcoats being sold in public, right next to a building destroyed by the Nazis. Yet in St. Petersburg, Soviet greatcoats and medals are sold in the shadow of a church that had been looted and closed by that very regime.

It is not as though there would not be a market for goods that showcased the negatives of Soviet rule – ration cards, internal passports, or other ‘negative’ memorabilia would probably sell fairly well, especially to tourists from countries on the ‘other side’ of the Cold War. Instead, the overwhelming majority of Soviet-related souvenirs were positive, or, at the very least, neutral in terms of their message. There were hundreds of Soviet-era pins, all highlighting some national achievement: performance in the Olympics, anniversaries of certain major events, even technical achievement, for example a series of pins celebrating Soviet cars throughout history. These all point to a positive picture of life in the Soviet Union, one where there was consistent and important national progress. Scholar Svetlana Boym has argued that there is a trend in Russia today towards a nostalgic sense of longing for the communist era as an era of normalcy and stability, and a general dismissal or minimalization of the regime’s flaws (Boym, 58). Thus, the Soviet items for sale perhaps convey the idea that modern Russians have positive – or at worst neutral – feelings towards the Soviet government.

Even individual souvenirs can indicate attitudes in a country or region. In this case, one particular model of matryoshka doll can indicate Russian attitudes towards Jewish people. These particular matryoshki pop up just as often as any other style of doll – that is to say, they cannot be found in every souvenir stall, but about half of them carried at least one version of the doll. They vary in size and seemed to have a few basic styles, all based heavily on anti-Semitic stereotypes. The outermost doll is a man with a large nose, ruddy cheeks, beady eyes with almost effeminate lashes, a black hat, and, of course, peyos and a beard. He either has a Star of David printed on his beard, or is playing a violin. The internal nesting dolls, although they vary in order and style between sets, are similarly stereotypical: a man engrossed in a book, or an old woman holding a loaf of challah. The innermost doll is always either a young boy with a yarmulke and peyos or a baby wrapped in the Israeli flag. While there is no overt malice present in the designs of these dolls, there is a definite air of an intensely stereotyped view of Jewish people.

Cheap Matryoshki Good Matryoshki

Cheaper matryoshki, top. Source: Reuters. More detailed matryoshki, bottom. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

On their own, of course, the dolls do not indicate much about actual attitudes. The souvenir markets had numerous matryoshki meant to appeal only to tourists, decorated with American political leaders, sports teams, famous bands, even popular fictional characters. There were also numerous ‘shock-value’ matryoshki – one contained Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and Adolf Hitler, among others. These dolls, however, were significantly different stylistically from the more traditional matryoshki – specifically, they were more cheaply made. The traditional dolls were painted on all sides in bright colors; the more tourist-oriented dolls tended to be painted only on one side, the other half or three-quarters of the doll was left as plain wood. The quality of painting was much higher on the traditional dolls – even the cheaper ones were more visually appealing than the non-traditional dolls. In this way, quality can be used as an indicator of whose views the matryoshki most clearly align with – higher-quality dolls tend to reflect traditional Russian attitudes and themes, while poorly made matryoshki tend to be intended solely for tourist consumption, and therefore reflect themes tourists might find interesting.

If the Jewish dolls were solely meant to appeal to tourists, one would expect that they would follow the trend of being low-quality. Instead, they are quite well-made. The dolls are painted all around, with extensive detail on all sides; the details themselves are intricate – everything is hand-painted on them, from the shine on glasses, to the wrinkle of fabric near buttons, to the seeds on challah. This strongly indicates that these dolls are aligned more with the traditional matryoshki; rather than being cheaply mass-produced with the minimal quality needed to sell, pride and care have been taken in their creation. This, in turn, implies that their design represents at least to an extent how Jewish people are viewed, or at least the prevalence of traditional stereotypes.

Souvenirs alone cannot reveal everything about a culture or its attitudes, but they provide an introduction to that culture. Russian souvenirs are no exception. By examining the behavior of the vendors in the markets themselves, one can see a strong undercurrent of nationalistic pride, as evidenced in their behavior towards the items they sell and their preferential treatment of customers who make an attempt to use the Russian language and align themselves with Russian educational institutions. Looking at the souvenir genre of Soviet memorabilia reveals contemporary attitudes towards the USSR that tend towards positive or, at the very least, ambivalent. Even examining individual goods, like the Jewish matryoshka dolls, can indicate the presence of certain attitudes – in this case, an acceptance of Jewish stereotypes. To the observant tourist, a trip down to the local souvenir market can be as culturally educational as any museum tour.

 

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“Glitter, Patches, and Impressions”: Nikolai Gogol’s Literary Treatment of the Absent Metanarrative of St. Petersburg (Sarah Wall)

The confluence of art with its cultural context and the reciprocal ways in which these often influence each other is not a new or momentous observation.  Take, for instance, the heralding of Romanticism that converged with nationalism in the mid-1800s, or the pessimistic early-twentieth-century Futurism that emerged in response to the European tensions that culminated in World War I.  Across centuries of human history, art has captured the ethos of its society and both preserves and expounds on it for posterity.  True artistic brilliance, however, is much rarer, evident when an artist sees not only his given cultural context but also how this context, if played out, will affect the future.  This is the gift of Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol, an author of Russian literature during its Golden Age of the mid-nineteenth century.  Because of his evaluation of the city of St. Petersburg as a Western construct not organic to the Russian people or the Russian experience, Gogol portrayed the city in his works as lacking in authenticity, ripe for demonic influences.  Such candid criticism leaves St. Petersburg natives in a difficult position.  They define themselves in terms of their cultured love for art and literature, yet their varied memorializations of Gogol introduces an intriguing dichotomy in their attempt to reconcile their respect for him as an author with contempt for him as a person.

Nikolai Gogol’s Analysis of St. Petersburg through Literature

For all of his clearly defined opinions of St. Petersburg, Gogol was not a native to the city he later called home.  Born in 1809 in Sorochintsy, a provincial village in present-day Ukraine, Gogol only immigrated to St. Petersburg at the age of nineteen.  The young idealist had long desired to reside in this self-professed cultural capital of the Russian Empire.  In a letter to his mother in February 1827, Gogol declared that “‘Sleeping or awake, I am always dreaming of Petersburg,’” and just four months later, he wrote, “‘Already, I mentally place myself in Petersburg… since I have always thought to find myself such a spot’” (Buckler 199-200).  However, Gogol’s enthusiasm in his expectations of the glorious Petersburg went drastically unfulfilled.  His dreams to become an important official in the bureaucracy, an actor, a poet, or an artist quickly soured, and, forced to settle for a position as a humble government office clerk, “he turned angrily against the city he had embraced with such hope” (Lincoln 122).  Indeed, in an 1829 letter to his mother, Gogol writes of his deep frustration in that “Petersburg does not seem to me at all what I thought – I imagined it much more beautiful, magnificent… All this makes me live as if in a desert” (Gogol, Letters 28-9).

Disdain and disappointment in the city experience colored several of Gogol’s stories, but his scathing sentiments may have stemmed from a far deeper place than mere disenchantment with the city.  He offers a more transcendent analysis that Petersburg is a shallow city lacking in legitimacy and self-awareness.  Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in his most famous short story, “Nevsky Prospekt.”  Published in 1835, the tale relates the story of two men, Piskaryov and Pirogov, and their independent realizations that all is not what it seems on Nevsky Prospekt, the boulevard that remains to this day the cultural heartbeat of St. Petersburg.  Piskaryov becomes romantically obsessed with a beautiful woman he sees on Nevsky and is shocked and dismayed to find that she is a prostitute.  In order to reconcile this reality with his romantic notions, he dreams that she is a virtuous woman of nobility trapped into prostitution and whom only he can rescue.  When he returns to the brothel to ask her to become his wife, however, “she interrupted his speech with an expression of scorn,” mocking him for the mere suggestion that she would want to marry him:  “in those words the whole of an ugly, degraded life was portrayed, the life of the true followers of vice, full of emptiness and idleness!” (Gogol, Complete Tales 227).

Lest the audience see in Piskaryov’s story merely a sad story of disillusionment, Gogol makes it clear that his experience with the false woman is symbolic of his views of St. Petersburg overall.  First, the story opens not with any mention of plot or characters but rather with an extended, extravagant description of Nevsky Prospekt:  its “atmosphere of gaiety,” with its shops and their “display of all the finest things the genius of man ever produced” (Gogol, Complete Tales 207).  On this boulevard, “you meet marvelous moustaches that no pen, no brush could do justice to… and the ladies’ sleeves that you meet on Nevsky Prospekt!  Ah, how exquisite!” (Gogol, Complete Tales 211).  As the fawning portrayal becomes sickeningly sweet, it becomes all too obvious that Gogol’s ridiculous exaggeration is pure satire and mockery.  Equally important to note is that the very first line of the story establishes that he intends this description to be a microcosm for the city of St. Petersburg overall:  “There is nothing finer than Nevsky Prospekt, not in Petersburg anyway:  it is the making of the city” (Gogol, Complete Tales 207, emphasis added).

Similarly crucial to Gogol’s overall message is a second shift, again away from the specific plots of the world of the characters to a more general discourse with his audience.  In fact, the author addresses us specifically with his command, “Oh, do not trust that Nevsky Prospekt!… Everything breathes deception.  It deceives at all hours, the Nevsky Prospekt does, but most of all when night falls… when the devil himself lights the street lamps to show everything in false colors” (Gogol, Complete Tales 238).  In the context of the exaggerated introduction and the story of Piskaryov and the prostitute, this final line in the story becomes a thesis in Gogol’s overall argument.  Nevsky Prospekt, the cultural pulse for the city of St. Petersburg, may well appear exquisite, virtuous, and glittering, but there is no organic substance to validate that description.  The city, in Gogol’s interpretation, becomes merely a deceptive ruse hiding demonism, darkness, and corruption.

The Source and Reason for Inauthenticity in the City

That Gogol’s disdain for the city is borne of an analysis that it is inauthentic to the Russian soul and experience is an argument corroborated both by Gogol’s own pen and by the arguments of various critics.  In his discussion of “Nevsky Prospekt,” historian W. Bruce Lincoln notes that “Gogol’s St. Petersburg was a detached place in which a perverse fascination with rank outweighed all human feeling… At the center of it all, forming the greatest of all the city’s many contradictions, was the Nevskii Prospect, at one and the same time enchanting and repulsive… In St. Petersburg, Nevskii Prospekt was ‘everything’” (Lincoln 123-4).  The falseness of the city overall necessarily results in this obsession with the shallow and ultimately meaningless set of ranks and appearances, which, as critic Donald Fanger argues, “The theme of misleading appearances developed here… is more properly a matter of the difficulty of judging by any appearances” (Fanger 113).

Indeed, Gogol didactically warns readers not to trust the glittering aura surrounding the boulevard, begging them to recognize the misleading falseness of the city.  The root cause of this falseness can only be found in Gogol’s own testament, preserved in the oft-cited 1829 letter to his mother, which becomes a thesis for how Gogol views the city’s inauthentic condition:

“Petersburg is not at all like other European capitals or Moscow.  In general each capital is characterized by its people, who throw their stamp of nationality on it; but Petersburg has no such character-stamp:  the foreigners who settled here have made themselves at home and aren’t like foreigners at all, and the Russians in their turn have turned into foreigners – they aren’t one thing or the other” (Gogol, Letters 29).

Part of this assessment comes from the very inorganic, top-down process of the establishment of the city itself:  in 1703, Peter the Great came to the swamps of present-day Petersburg and by imperial decree built the city with the intention of establishing for Russia a modern, technologically advanced “Window on the West.”  Indeed, he was not unsuccessful in his endeavors, for “by the middle of Elizabeth’s [ruled 1741-1762] reign, St. Petersburg had become everything Peter the Great had envisioned:  a fortress, a bustling port, a window on the West, a center of government, and a model for everything Russia might be (or ought to become)” (Lincoln 348).  Whatever its technological advancements and modernization, however, the fact that it was not the Russian people themselves who inculcated their own identity into the city led Gogol to argue that St. Petersburg was not authentically Russian:  “There is something about it that resembles a European colony in America:  the same dearth of deep-rooted national characteristics, and the same admixture of foreign elements that has not yet been amalgamated into a solid mass” (cited in Maguire 76).  Thus, without depth, significance, or authentic Russian-ness, all that remains in St. Petersburg is, as one as literary scholar put it, “all glitter, patches, and impressions” substituting for and replacing the profundity of the genuine human spirit (Maguire 77).

St. Petersburg’s Reciprocal Response:  The Memorialization of Gogol

Naturally, for a city that promotes itself as the cultural heartbeat of Russia, the fact that a famed author from the Golden Age of Russian literature unmistakably holds a less-than-favorable estimation of St. Petersburg would be difficult for natives to accept.  After all, Gogol’s place in the Russian literary tradition is akin to that of Fyodor Dostoevsky, his contemporary and just as much of a social commentator during the second half of the 19th century.  Interestingly, though, even in my personal experiences, it seems as if Petersburgers would rather forget that Gogol was so prolific.  During a placement test on my first day at St. Petersburg University, I informed the professor of my love for Russian literature, to which she immediately probed, as all Russians do, whether I had read any Pushkin.  I responded, “No, not yet, but I really love Gogol,” and the look of shock on her face and the way she repeated, “Gogol?!” made me certain I had just failed my placement test.  I encountered this attitude all over St. Petersburg, for it was not confined to the university; even my host mother, when I informed her that I loved reading Gogol’s short stories, demonstrated the same evident surprise and disbelief as the professors.

Perhaps even more telling is the way in which the city has memorialized its “redheaded stepchild” both through traditional monuments and through businesses, namely The Gogol Restaurant.  Perhaps the most famous and most traditional memorialization of Gogol in this city is the monument located approximately fifty feet from Nevsky Prospekt.  The monument, while still visible from the boulevard, now stands behind the makeshift “countdown” to the 2014 Winter Olympics to be held in St. Petersburg, so clearly the focus of every passerby is on Sochi, not on Gogol.  If, however, someone does venture behind the Sochi countdown, on an avenue directly across from the famous Kazan Cathedral, there stands a gloomy, ten-foot-high Gogol, wrapped in an overcoat pulled tight against the cold, his eyes cast downward as he gazes beyond his left shoulder.  Such a gray, melancholy memorial stands in direct contrast to my own experiences on Nevsky Prospekt and in the greater St. Petersburg; I personally find it difficult to reconcile the gloom exuded by Gogol’s monument with the lively, bustling air of Nevsky just beyond him.  Perhaps this is not an unintentional coincidence:  given Gogol’s disdain for Nevsky’s “bustling liveliness” that, in his opinion, was a mere veneer for deception and demonic influences, it stands to reason that Petersburgers would want to mock his “gloom and doom” attitude and make his monument unfamiliar and out-of-place in its surrounding atmosphere.

A second monument to Gogol, erected on a less central street in St. Petersburg, offers a contrasting image.  This one, much more lighthearted than the first, was originally “erected in 1994 as part of the ‘Zolotoi Ostap’ festival of humor and satire” and is nothing more than a plaque with a giant pink nose slapped on it, inscribed only with the title, “Major Kovalyov’s Nose” (Bigg 1).  This monument is a testament to Gogol’s oddest short story, “The Nose,” in which Major Kovalyov awakens one morning to find that his nose is missing from his face and is instead parading around St. Petersburg as a civil servant higher in rank than Kovalyov himself; despite its initial refusal to do so, the nose has reattached itself by the next morning.  Critics are at a loss to fully explain this bizarre short story, some seeing it as a story as a scathing critique of the role of the rank system, while others see it as just as dream of Kovalyov, but each of these explanations seems to fall apart under deeper scrutiny.  Intrigued that St. Petersburg would choose this story to memorialize Gogol, I unfortunately could find only a picture of the monument and the address of its location (11 prospekt Rimskogo-Korsakova), a location which turned out to have no trace of “Major Kovalyov’s Nose.”

Two aspects of this missing monument offer intriguing glimpses into St. Petersburg’s memorialization of our writer.  First, the decision to memorialize his strangest, most complex story by reducing it to a mere statue of a nose demonstrates a satirical treatment of the author that subtly requests that passersby not take him too seriously as an author.  Secondly, when the monument went missing and the city decided against replacing it, they demonstrated their belief that it lacked enough cultural significance to pursue its restoration.

While the exploration of monuments is indeed very telling in the memorialization of an author, it is equally prudent to explore other avenues in which a person’s memory is preserved; in the case of Gogol, this is certainly the case in the restaurant bearing Gogol’s name, located off Admiralteiskii bulevar about a quarter-mile from Nevsky prospekt.  Describing itself as a “gastronomic play in St. Petersburg style,” Gogol Restaurant offers its customers “a wide choice of classic Russian dishes and the more sophisticated meals that used to please St. Petersburg literary Bohemia.  The project owners aim to recreate the very atmosphere of St. Petersburg books of Nikolai Gogol, the language of the epoch, the uniqueness of home Russian cuisine that borrowed so many fragrant names and exquisite recipes from the French” (“Gastronomic Play” 1).  However, it is important to muse whether Gogol would appreciate being attached to this restaurant, for the whole experience and atmosphere it attempts to create is an entirely falsified construct.  First of all, the menu, while boasting limitless delicacies, draws very little from Russian cuisine and crafts French recipes instead; this is a direct slap in the face to Gogol’s messages, which revolved around genuineness and the corresponding “demonism” that arises from losing a connection to authentic Russian-ness.  Beyond the menu, however, the existence of the restaurant itself is a construct, for it is a role-playing enterprise that attempts to whisk its characters back to Gogol’s time and day.  This level of pretense is almost comical when observed alongside Gogol’s hatred and fear of inauthenticity.  Why would a restaurant whose entire premise is an inorganic construct choose to associate itself with Gogol?  Of all the 19th-century authors who also wrote during this period of the Golden Age of Russian literature, from Dostoevsky to Turgenev to Tolstoy, why emulate a role-playing enterprise on the basis of the only one who mocked St. Petersburg for its very nature as a constructed city?  Just as Gogol derisively mocked St. Petersburg through seemingly lighthearted, ridiculous exaggeration, perhaps the owners of the Gogol Restaurant (and by extension, perhaps the city itself) are following the author’s lead and using seemingly lighthearted ironies to derisively mock him as well.

Taken together, these three preservations of Gogol’s memory give a very clear picture of the manner in which St. Petersburg has chosen to memorialize its reluctant son.  Each in its own way is subtly mocking and satirical:  the gloominess of the statue of Gogol does not match the lively bustle of the surrounding avenue; “Major Kovalyov’s Nose,” while in itself a satirical plaque, was not even deemed important enough to replace; and the Gogol Restaurant has built an entire enterprise based on the very pretense and lack of authenticity that its namesake so despised.  Just as Gogol employed ridicule and hyperbole to shroud his disdain for St. Petersburg in mockery, St. Petersburg has in turn adopted that same philosophy in the way that they have memorialized and preserved his memory.

Gogol’s Prophetic Words:  The Missing Metanarrative in Russia Today

While Gogol’s impressions of St. Petersburg provide an interesting commentary on the Westernized, constructed nature of the city in the 19th century, much more interesting and, indeed, critical to Russia’s future, is whether this impression holds in the present day.  During my many wanderings down Nevsky Prospekt, I was first struck, even a little overwhelmed, by the hurried activity of everyone around me.  From the tour guides shouting advertisements of excursions on every block; to people pouring in and out of the ritziest and most beautiful “grocery store” I’ve ever seen, Eliseyev’s Emporium; to the portraits and artwork, a picture of culture and refinement, being sold all over the city, Nevsky truly does remain today the heartbeat of St. Petersburg.

However, once I allowed myself to more critically examine Nevsky Prospekt, my perceptions were altered as I began to realize the depth of, as Gogol put it, “foreignness” in the city.  First of all, despite the fact that the nearest English-speaking neighbor to St. Petersburg is 1500 miles away, the English language is nothing short of prolific across the metropolis:  souvenir-shop clerks greet customers with, “Hello,” rather than, “Zdravstvuite,” every menu has an English counterpart, and the Latin alphabet was so common, particularly on Nevsky, that I often saw more of it than Cyrillic during casual glances down the avenue.  In terms of the abundance of English, though, the moment that shocked me the most was on my final day in Petersburg, when I happened to walk by a restaurant on a side-street off Nevsky and noticed that the name of the restaurant and the descriptions of the menu were written first in large letters in English, and underneath in smaller letters in Russian.  That evidence points to something beyond mere businessmen catering to an English-speaking client base; putting a city’s native language beneath a foreign one demonstrates Petersburg’s embrace of imported elements at the expense of its intrinsic culture – if, granted, such a culture even exists.

The presence of foreign elements in St. Petersburg and their substitution of any sense of organic Russian-ness is only a small part of an overall trend in Russia towards Westernization and globalization.  Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, profound economic transformation has taken place, due largely to the actions of the economic power-players like the United States and Germany; “the ‘transition economies’ have been encouraged to open their crisis-ridden economies to international trade and attract foreign investment” (Koehn 1).  Indeed, the Russian government has greatly encouraged foreign investment in Russia:  even from 2012 to 2013, foreign investment jumped 10.7%, reaching $370.6 billion by June (Razumovskaya 1).  From McDonald’s to Burger King on every block in Petersburg and Moscow to fliers on the street advertising 1000 rubles per hour for English tutoring, Russians are nothing short of enthralled by Western, American, and Anglophilic culture.

In this way, the St. Petersburg that Gogol observed and so greatly feared, lacking in any “character-stamp… [where] the Russians in their turn have turned into foreigners – they aren’t one thing or the other,” has become a microcosm for the globalized, Westernized Russia of today (Gogol, Letters 29).  The fall of the Soviet Union left Russia without a metanarrative, a common myth of heroism and pride that unites Russians at their core and gives an organic sensibility to their national identity.  The missing metanarrative is what Gogol first detected in St. Petersburg, due to its top-down establishment by an authoritarian tsar who continued to force the country into a Western, modern role for which there was no organic precedence.  What Gogol saw as inauthentic and demonic, mere “glitter” and “impressions” at the expense of any substance, was the result of a constructed metanarrative inorganic to the genuine Russian experience.  Because of the presence of foreign conglomerates that accompanied the globalization process, this analysis now spreads beyond St. Petersburg into the country itself; the Russian people, without a sense of who they are and what it means to be Russian, embrace instead foreign elements and cultures, in turn resulting in further degradation of what was once their organic fabric.

In a way, Gogol was prophetic in his analysis of St. Petersburg as resembling a foreign colony within his country, for this not only remains true today but has expanded to paint a picture of the greater story of the Russian nation.  Little wonder, then, that the attitude I encountered in St. Petersburg, from the responses of locals to the monuments and enterprises “venerating” him, is one of mockery and satire:  inherent in Gogol’s analysis is a threat to the way in which Russians have chosen to cope with their missing metanarrative, and rather than confront that threat, they would prefer to write him off.  In turning their backs on his analysis, however, the struggle for Russians becomes how they can legitimize the organic Russian metanarrative, replacing the dark, shallow “glitter, patches, and impressions” Gogol observed with the genuine substance foundational to the national experience.

Works Cited

 

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Visualizing St. Petersburg

Visualizing St. Petersburg: Documentary Filmmaking Abroad

The documentary filmmaking process requires a tremendous amount of patience, discipline, creativity, and flexibility. You need to deal with people, but know how to troubleshoot technology; you must be organized, but open to spontaneity; you should be prepared for everything, but comfortable working in the unknown. For the eight students who studied abroad in the summer of 2011 in St. Petersburg, Russia, they had the added challenge of doing it all in Russian.

Over the course of the past three years, professors Frederick Corney and Alexander Prokhorov made undergraduate research the central component of William & Mary’s St. Petersburg summer study abroad program. Each year, students work on research projects concerning places of memory and urban development in St. Petersburg. Specifically, students examine how these sites are remembered within a larger, public representation. Professor Prokhorov, the program’s director during the summer of 2011, wanted to include an element of video production into this year’s project and that’s how I became involved.

As the college’s environmental filmmaking-in-residence, I’ve sought to incorporate media production into current research and coursework across disciplines on campus. Professor Prokhorov saw the potential for collaboration, and with the support of a Reves Center Faculty Fellows grant, students gained access to camcorders and microphones, learned field production skills, collaborated with St. Petersburg journalist students, and acquired international documentary production experience.

“Making a documentary is a lot of work, but it’s exhilarating after you interview someone,” says Sophie Kosar ’14, whose project focuses on the controversial construction of a new seaport and business district, the Marine Façade, on the western shores of the city. “You realize you had to forge this connection with your subject; you had to do this yourself.”

Will Lahue ’12, whose project explores how Russian Orthodox community and Goth subculture define Smolensky Cemetery as a site of commemoration, realizes the benefits of working on his film. “I’ve gained a more rapid acclamation into Russian society. Just running around getting things done, meeting people; it’s been a challenge. I’ve needed to accomplish a lot in Russian and that’s been good for me.”

Introducing students to video production in study abroad programs is incredibly enabling; the filmmaking process forces them out of their comfort zone, stretches their limits, and pushes them to interact in ways they would not have otherwise. The project has the potential to serve as a model for other study abroad program that want to challenge their participants to make connections, to pay attention, and to be creative.

“The biggest thing I’ve gained in this project is confidence in networking with people,” says Monika Bernotas ‘12. “It’s amazing how many people have returned my emails to say they would be willing to help out.”

On November 29th, these documentaries were screened to the larger William and Mary community. In March, they will be exhibited at the Slavic Forum at the University of Virginia.

Jes Therkelsen is a filmmaker, photographer, media consultant, and activist. His work has confronted issues such as human rights, sustainable development and environmental justice. His films have won a D.C. Peer Award, a CINE Golden Eagle and have screened in festivals across the country. He has been a Peace Fellow in Nepal, a Washington D.C. Artist Fellow, and a Flaherty Film Fellow. He is the Environmental Filmmaker-in-residence at the College of William and Mary.

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Works Cited: Kandinsky (Barry O’Keefe)

Figes, Orlando. Natasha’s Dance A Cultural History of Russia. New York: Picador, 2003.

Peg Weiss. Kandinsky and Old Russia. The Artist as Ethnographer and Shaman. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1995.